In December 2025 the Maersk Sebarok sailed through the Bab el-Mandeb strait — the first transit by a major carrier since Houthi attacks began pushing ships around Africa in November 2023. Maersk did not announce it until the vessel was through.
That caution was the story, and it still is.
CMA CGM went further, publishing a proper return on three services. Its INDAMEX loop connecting India and Pakistan with the US East Coast was rescheduled to transit Suez on both legs, cutting round-trip time by two weeks to 77 days and freeing two ships, according to eeSea data powered by Xeneta. Then it reversed course, pulling services back after briefly running three loops through the region.
Carriers keep testing the water and stepping back out. There is a reason, and it is not only the missiles.
The capacity nobody wants released
Two years of sailing around the Cape of Good Hope did something useful for carrier economics: it hid an enormous amount of overcapacity. Longer voyages consume ships. Niels Madsen of Sea-Intelligence estimates a return to Suez would hand roughly 6% of global fleet capacity back to the market almost overnight, while 8–9% of the global fleet is being delivered annually between 2024 and 2028. Judah Levine at Freightos puts the release at more than two million TEU.
That capacity arrives into a market that is already soft. Xeneta recorded long-term rates from the Far East to the Mediterranean at $2,308 per FEU on 21 January 2026, down 25% in three months, with North Europe at $2,010, down 10% — both the lowest since 2023, before the crisis began lifting them.
HSBC had reckoned disruption lasting into mid-2026 would hold rate declines to between 9% and 16%. After Maersk’s transits it warned of a further 10% slide, enough to push Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd into losses.
So the shortest route is also the one that breaks the freight market. Carriers understand this arithmetic better than anyone.
Security is still the binding constraint
None of which means the decision is commercial. Peter Sand of Xeneta framed the risk assessment carriers actually run: it examines the Houthis’ ability, opportunity and intent. The ability is not in question. Intent is what carriers want assurance on — and opportunity grows as more ships return.
By May 2026 the picture had darkened rather than cleared. Renewed military escalation involving the United States, Iran, Israel and regional proxies weakened earlier expectations of a progressive return through 2026, and several lines that had explored limited re-entry took a more cautious position. War-risk insurance premiums continue to offset much of the saving from a shorter voyage.
Why a reopening would hurt before it helped
Assume it happens. The first effect is not cheaper freight.
Ships that left Asia expecting to round Africa would arrive at European terminals a week or more early, in bunches. Drewry’s Arya Anshuman and Simon Heaney warn that ports may struggle to absorb a sudden surge of arrivals while cargo owners remain wary of routing valuable goods through the region. Congestion would spike rates in the short term before the released capacity crushed them.
The Cape route has also been doing quiet work as floating storage. Twelve extra days at sea is inventory you have already paid for and do not have to warehouse. Take that away and stock arrives earlier than your DC wants it.
The planning response is not to forecast the reopening. It is to make it survivable either way: index-linked pricing rather than a fixed rate you will regret, renegotiation triggers tied to a date or a percentage move, and surcharges defined clearly enough that they come off when the diversions do.